Who knew that shareholder voting could be so… suspenseful?
If you missed the news, Proctor & Gamble has been locked in a bitter battle with shareholder activist Nelson Peltz, who wants a seat on the board. This led to the biggest shareholder battle to date, with over 2.5 billion votes (for 2.5 billion issued shares) in play. Robocalls, social media ads and a flood of mailings… the tactics got fierce.
At stake is the structure of the consumer goods conglomerate. Peltz – CEO of asset management firm Trian Partners – wants a seat on the board, and to break P&G up into three distinct units, to streamline operations and add flexibility. P&G says that the recent restructuring is already showing positive results, and changing the composition of the board would bring unnecessary disruption.
At the annual general shareholders’ meeting, P&G announced that Peltz’ bid had been defeated. Shareholders had voted to not give him a seat on the board, by a margin of 6.15 million votes, which sounds like a lot but when taken in context of the overall number of outstanding shares, was only 0.2%. A statistician would argue that is well within the margin of error.
And she would be right. Yesterday the FT reported that a recount by an independent expert found that the margin was only 43,000, in favour of Mr. Peltz. Effectively, a dead heat. The final, definitive results are not yet in. But Mr. Peltz could well get his board seat.
Why the lack of clarity in the outcome?
As you have most likely seen with national elections, counting votes is cumbersome, and largely manual. Even today, there is no definitive way to ensure that votes are not double-counted or falsely filed. One of the main problems is collecting all the votes, which are still mainly submitted on paper, either at a company’s annual general meeting, or sent in via physical mail (although some firms allow online voting). Another is making sure that the count is not manipulated. This requires rigorous identity verification, and a decentralized process of tally.
A separate issue is identifying who has the right to vote – with shares held at central depositories and “ownership” represented by a type of cession of rights, this is often not as clear as it should be.
Could blockchain technology, with its security and automation, help? Several large proxy voting managers believe so.
Last year, Russia’s National Settlement Depository announced that it has tested a blockchain-based voting system. The Abu Dhabi Stock Exchange unveiled a blockchain-based voting service that allows shareholders to both participate in and observe the process. And Nasdaq ran an e-voting trial, which recorded stock ownership on a blockchain platform, and issued digital voting right assets and tokens.
Earlier this year, Broadridge – the world’s largest provider of proxy voting infrastructure – revealed that it is building a blockchain platform on ethereum to streamline the sharing of information between custodians. A pilot run was successfully executed (in parallel with voting using traditional software) with JP Morgan, Northern Trust and Banco Santander.
Around the same time, financial services company TMX group (operator of the Toronto and Montreal stock exchanges, among others) revealed that it had completed a proxy shareholder voting prototype built on Hyperledger
And just last week, a group of central securities depositories (CSDs) announced progress on a distributed ledger proxy voting platform. Swift is among the institutions participating, to assist in ensuring compliance with international financial messaging standards (which would open up the platform to uses other than voting).
Timelines on any of the above projects going into the production are at the moment vague. Will any of them even happen? With shareholder voting generally an in-network activity (with limited, if any, need for participation from outside organizations), why use blockchain at all? Why not just go for a robust, efficient database?
Because of the vulnerabilities of centralization, which in many cases doesn’t matter – but when it comes to voting, that’s a different story. First of all, even a distributed database can be hacked and manipulated. Second, shareholders need to be certain that the vote was fair, and that the company in question has not tried to influence the tally. If they are granted real-time transparency into the voting process are more likely to trust the system, and therefore more likely to vote.
Plus, as shareholder voting becomes even more important, propelled by improvements in the technology (reduction of friction) and increased activism, audits of processes by external parties are going to become even more of a regular feature. An access node would facilitate that, as well as reduce the costs.
And finally, proxy polls are not cheap. According to FactSet Research Systems Inc., a “typical” proxy battle costs about $1 million, mainly from printing, mailing and legal fees. For context, the P&G battle is expected to cost the company over $35 million (small change compared to its Q2 income of $2.2 billion, but still…).
And even with that expenditure, it might not win. Final results are yet to come, so the battle isn’t over yet.
But the drama and nail-biting suspense sheds light on the urgent need to reform shareholder voting technology. Current platforms are, in general, inefficient. And electronic voting systems run by any one organization, even audited ones, will always have a cloud of doubt over the controlling interests. The transparency and security of distributed ledger systems could offer a more robust, lasting and scalable solution. Widespread use is still a long way off, though, and they’re unlikely to be practical until the murky issue of stock registration is solved.
While perhaps not the decentralize-the-organizations disruption that blockchain technology originally promised, it would be a step towards a more democratic governance, enabling shareholders to participate in corporate decisions more frequently and with less upheaval. It could end up giving shareholder activists more firepower and motivation, even perhaps going as far as to change what we understand by “shareholder capitalism”. Or capitalism overall, for that matter.
And when it comes to letting the market decide, it must be galling for the P&G board to see the positive price reaction to the news that they might not get their way. If the close outcome of the voting doesn’t send the board a strong message (in other words, when almost half of your shareholders side with your most vocal critic, you’re doing something wrong), perhaps the voice of the market will.